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Title: Free trade agreements: attractions and liabilities

Argument essay: 

Argument essays argue for a position, usually stated in the introduction. They may consider and refute opposing arguments.

Copyright: Isaac Holliss


Honours year (postgraduate)

Description: What exactly are FTAs and what are their political and economic attractions and liabilities from the NZ government's point of view?

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Free trade agreements: attractions and liabilities


New Zealand is an active participant in the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) which has occurred since the end of the Cold War. FTAs aim to reduce trade barriers between two or more economies, and although they are discriminatory, they remain compliant with international trade law. NZ focuses its FTA strategy in East Asia and looks set to conclude a number of new FTAs in the coming years. FTAs bring economic, strategic, and multilateral advantages for the NZ government, but they also constrain the its policy independence, and care must be taken to minimise risks of trade diversion and the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect. NZ should continue its pursuit of FTAs given its need to remain competitive in relation to its trading rivals.

Free trade agreements: An introduction

As an isolated island nation heavily dependent on trade, New Zealand is justifiably concerned with maintaining and improving market access for its exports. In recent years, NZ has joined the global trend of using bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in order to open new markets for its producers. Public discourse regarding FTAs is too often ill-informed, and so this essay seeks to provide greater clarity to the issue by examining what a FTA is and the different forms it can take. This analysis will survey NZ’s involvement in the proliferation of FTAs since the end of the Cold War, and then evaluate the various economic and political attractions and liabilities presented by FTAs for the NZ government. 

FTAs, known variously as Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs), Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), Closer Economic Partnerships (CEPs), or Strategic Economic Partnerships (SEPs), are trade agreements aimed at reducing trade barriers and improving access to others’ markets.[1] The agreements are formed of chapters, covering issues as diverse as non-tariff measures, investment, and labour and environmental policy.[2] FTAs are rarely small or concise, and reach up to 200 pages, and the length of time taken to conclude FTAs varies depending on the scale of contentious issues and domestic political wrangling.[3] Negotiations towards NZ’s FTA with the GCC, for instance, began in 2007 and were concluded in 2010, but the agreement has yet to be ratified by GCC member states.[4]

FTAs exist in several varieties: customs unions; non-reciprocal trade agreements; and common markets. A customs union represents an agreement among members to apply a common external tariff on goods entering the FTA from outside.[5] Non-reciprocal trade agreements allow trade to be used as a development tool, providing developing countries with access to lucrative markets without having to open their markets in return, although these are accompanied by stringent conditionality.[6] Common markets such as the European Union require substantial economic and usually political integration, often involving the free movement of capital and labour.

FTAs are discriminatory, and rarely achieve ‘free trade’ in its purest form. A FTA discriminates against non-members by providing preferential access to members. They remain legal under international trade treaties, despite violating the most-favoured nation principle (MFN). The MFN is established in the first paragraph of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which requires that states apply equal treatment to goods.[7] This is qualified by Article 24, however, which allows that the GATT ‘shall not prevent…the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area’, with the only condition that tariffs do not increase for non-member states.[8] FTAs can be formed between two economies (bilateral), three or more economies (plurilateral), or between already-formed FTAs. Examples of these different varieties include the NZ-China FTA, the Trans Pacific Partnership, and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), respectively.

New Zealand’s free trade agreements

NZ has participated fully in the proliferation of FTAs which has occurred since the end of the Cold War. Whereas between 1948 and 1989 65 FTAs were notified to the GATT secretariat, that figure has since grown to 310.[9] In fact, as of 2010, Mongolia is the only state in the world not party to some sort of FTA.[10] The trend is further underscored by the fact that over half of all world merchandise trade is conducted under FTAs, as opposed to only 28% in 1990.[11] Although NZ is party to only eight FTAs, it is illustrative that seven were signed post-2000, with five more under negotiation.[12]  This indicates that NZ’s appetite for FTAs is growing, along with its confidence and experience in their negotiation. NZ’s FTAs are becoming more economically and politically significant; whereas the first five years of the new millennium saw agreements signed with Singapore, Brunei, and Chile, the next five years saw agreements reached with China, ASEAN, and negotiations beginning with Russia, India, and through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).[13] A survey of Table 1 is evidence that Asian countries form the bulk of NZ’s existing FTA strategy.



Year entered into force
















ASEAN + Australia






Hong Kong          



Table 1: New Zealand’s current free trade agreements.[14]

In all of its FTA negotiations NZ pursues high quality agreements with as few exceptions as possible, with considerable success. The Australian-NZ CER agreement, for instance, has been described as “the world’s most comprehensive, effective and mutually compatible free trade agreement”.[15]A study of trade agreements between four economies – the EU, US, Canada, and Japan – revealed that approximately seven per cent of tariff lines were excluded from their agreements as ‘sensitive products’ concentrated mainly in the agricultural and food sectors.[16] In contrast the NZ-Malaysia FTA will see barriers removed on all but 1.1 per cent of tariff lines.[17] NZ has good cause to be concerned with market access, given that 33% of its GDP is derived from trade.[18] To this end, NZ’s trade policy has three agendas: multilateral negotiations, in the form of WTO ‘rounds’; regional or plurilateral FTAs, such as the P4, or TPP; and bilateral FTAs.[19] NZ’s attitude at the close of the millennium is best summed up by Tim Groser, when he argued that ‘we need an insurance policy’ in case multilateral talks continue to founder, as indeed has been the case.[20] The large number of FTAs in progress, shown in Table 2 below, demonstrates that NZ intends to pursue this strategy into the foreseeable future.






Preliminary report in 2009.



Ongoing, since 2009.

US, Vietnam, Peru, Malaysia


Ongoing, since 2010.



Ongoing, since 2010.

Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan


Ongoing, since 2010.

Gulf Cooperation Council


Concluded but not yet signed.

Table 2: New Zealand’s prospective FTAs.[21]


Political and economic advantages


NZ’s FTAs contribute to its economic growth, and hence to the government’s electoral success, by promoting NZ trade in three ways. First, FTAs promote trade through their improvements to market access for NZ exporters.[22] Lower barriers to trade in an export market will improve profits for NZ exporters by eliminating tariff payments and allow them to compete more effectively within that market through lower prices. FTAs also promote NZ’s trade in creative ways that even the most ambitious multilateral forum could not achieve. For instance, the NZ-China FTA contained a commitment from China to maintain, on its Ministry of Education’s ‘Study Abroad’ website, a list of 37 NZ tertiary institutions at which Chinese students are able to study, providing exposure and official endorsement for these institutions.[23] Second, NZ’s FTAs diversify its customer base, providing greater stability during economic downturns and taking advantage of growth occurring in emerging economies. For example, the NZ-China FTA increased China’s importance vis-à-vis NZ’s other trading partners. As of 2010, a review indicated that bilateral trade had increased by more than a third to $11.1 billion since the FTA’s entry into force in 2008.[24] China has also become relatively more important for NZ, representing NZ’s second largest trading partner in 2010 in contrast to 2004 when it ranked fourth.[25] Although it is difficult to know whether this trend was caused by the free trade agreement or by China’s economic growth, at the very least the FTA helped reinforce an existing trend. By relying more on China, and less on the US and Japan, NZ’s proportion of trade with high-growth countries is growing at the expense of trade with low-growth countries. Third, FTAs help to reduce business uncertainty, one common cause of which is the ‘binding overhang’, which refers to the gap between a country’s legal tariff obligations and their actual practice, the latter of which is usually lower.[26]  This binding overhang creates uncertainty for NZ producers as there is no legal restriction, and therefore no recourse, against a state increasing its tariffs to any level up to the bound rate. NZ’s FTAs create more certainty for its exporters by committing both parties to concrete, timetabled tariff reductions, with a date by which free trade in the majority of merchandise trade is to be achieved. In addition, the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in NZ’s agreements increases the competitiveness of NZ business with foreign firms, which may hitherto have been operating within relaxed regulations, creating an advantage.


FTAs provide the NZ government with strategic benefits. NZ officials are open about the strategic value of FTAs; Tim Groser, MFAT’s Principal Economic Advisor during the negotiations of the NZ-Singapore FTA, argued that ‘the case for such a FTA is almost wholly strategic’.[27] Unlike political or security agreements, FTAs rarely contain references to political or security arrangements, although human rights clauses feature prominently in many non-reciprocal agreements. Instead, FTAs complement the NZ government’s relationships by signalling commitment to an emerging relationship, or the deepening of an existing relationship, such as the NZ-Singapore relationship.[28] FTAs build trust between countries on two levels: at the institutional level between the countries’ respective trade ministries; and on a personal level between the negotiators and politicians involved in hammering out the agreement. In both cases, the positive interactions of those involved with the other party may accompany them as they progress to higher positions within their ministries. FTAs also provide NZ with an alternative method with which to achieve reform in a partner country. As a liberal Western country, NZ seeks to promote human rights where it can. One area where trade and human rights intersect is labour standards, and to this effect NZ included agreements on labour rights alongside its FTAs with the Philipines, Thailand, Brunei, Singapore, and China.[29]


NZ’s FTAs complement multilateral negotiations in a number of ways. First, NZ’s participation in FTA negotiations allows its negotiators to retain or improve their skills, which can then be applied in multilateral forums. In addition, not only do these negotiators become more confident in their roles, thereby improving NZ’s presence at the multilateral negotiating table, but they also encounter alternative, and often very creative, remedies for common problems. Second, FTAs provide a testing ground for new issues before they enter multilateral agreements, such as trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) or intellectual property rights (TRIPs). Recent chapters seen in the Doha round such as services, intellectual property, environmental standards, and investment, were first raised, and many of their details addressed, in bilateral and regional forums.[30] Third, NZ’s FTAs are an alternative path toward achieving free trade given the stalled Doha Round. In addition to the ability to make some progress where the multilateral stalemate allows for none, NZ’s FTAs realise the benefits of free trade far more quickly than is possible through multilateral negotiations. Whereas multilateral agreements reduce barriers incrementally, and at the rate of the lowest common denominator, FTAs are initiated only with governments who are willing to make the necessary changes to reach an agreement resulting in ‘deeper cuts by fewer countries’.[31] An emerging trend of agreements between two existing FTAs, or accession of additional countries into existing FTAs, gives credence to the notion that FTAs are ‘building blocks’ towards global free trade.[32] Examples include AANZFTA, the FTA between MERCOSUR and the Andean Community, and negotiations by Australia, Vietnam, and the US to join the TPP. It remains too early to determine whether this trend will continue, leading larger regional trading blocs to integrate, however these early signs are promising.


Political and economic liabilities


NZ’s FTAs contain the potential to impose economic costs on its businesses if assertions of trade diversion and the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect are proven to be correct. Trade diversion occurs where a FTA causes production to be shifted to a less efficient country due to the existence of trade preferences.[33] The trade-diversion effect is minimised by the fact that although over half of world merchandise trade occurs between FTA partners, only 16 percent of world merchandise trade is preferential, i.e. with lower tariffs for FTA members, and less than 2 percent of merchandise trade face preference margins of more than 10 percent.[34] Bhagwati contends that in a highly competitive global economy even a small preferential advantage may cause trade diversion.[35] Although the possible existence of trade diversion has been well established in economic theory, a lack of empirical evidence means that for now the risk of possible trade diversion will not deter policymakers from pursuing preferential agreements. NZ’s FTAs may contribute to increasing export costs for businesses by creating a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of overlapping trade regulations, in particular rules of origin (ROOs), which create confusion, distortions, and is overall trade-reducing.[36] ROOs vary from agreement to agreement, and sometimes even by product within FTAs. This creates uncertainty among exporters as to which ROOs apply where and to whom. Exporters must devote resources in order to determine where best to produce certain components, and in the case of a good such as Apple’s iPod, which is made up of parts from nine companies in five countries, this can become complicated, and hence costly.[37] Again, concrete data on these costs are hard to come by, particularly in the Asia-Pacific context. It may be that costs imposed by ROOs are a necessary evil in a second-best world, and indeed present an opportunity for regional cooperation in order to rationalise ROOs and other administrative burdens in the future. APEC, for instance, has created a draft ‘best practice’ ROO chapter which members can use in their future agreements.[38]

Policy independence

NZ’s FTAs with other highly-liberalised economies may require revision of NZ’s domestic policies, resulting in a loss of the government’s policy independence, or the adoption of unpopular reforms. Critics of the proposed TPP trade negotiations have identified the deal as a threat to NZ’s ability to formulate its own policies, such as food safety regulations and medicine provision.[39] Chief among public concern regarding the TPP are possible changes to the PHARMAC system, NZ’s bulk-buying medicines provider.[40] If the Australian-US FTA is any indication of how a FTA with the US could affect NZ’s medicine policies, then public concern may be misplaced, as the Australian equivalent to PHARMAC escaped relatively unscathed. Although submissions by the US pharmaceutical industry lobby paint a grim picture for NZ’s policies, these do not represent US government policy.[41] With regards to NZ’s agreements with developing countries, Amnesty International and the Greens party have expressed concern that NZ’s FTAs with developing countries may limit its ability to speak out against human rights abuses in those countries.[42]


NZ’s FTAs may reduce the chances of reaching an agreement in the WTO’s Doha Round. Since every country has limited resources with which to negotiate trade issues, FTAs necessarily consume resources which could otherwise be used at the multilateral level. This is particularly the case when considering NZ and many of its smaller FTA partners, such as Chile, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, and the limited resources which they can assign to trade negotiations. FTAs require political capital in order for governments to win domestic support for deals. Since FTAs deliver greater immediate benefits than multilateral negotiations, politicians may be tempted to expend their capital on achieving smaller deals which contain exceptions in sensitive goods, rather than addressing concerns attached to the Doha Round. A brief survey of trade agreements in the years before and after the Uruguay Round suggests that the Round was concluded despite the number of FTAs nearly doubling between 1990 and 1994. In addition, the number of FTAs continued to increase at a rapid rate in the years immediately after the Uruguay Round was concluded, suggesting that a multilateral agreement does not satisfy governments’ desire for bilateral and regional deals.  

Conclusion: New Zealand’s free-trade future

NZ has proven itself capable of concluding lucrative, high-quality trade agreements with its most important trading partners, and looks set to continue to do so in the coming years. Although the MFAT views a multilateral agreement in the form of the Doha Round as the best-case scenario for NZ, it recognises that in a second-best world bilateral and regional trade agreements may represent the best that the NZ government can achieve. Maintaining competitiveness with its trading rivals must remain a driving concern of a government which wants to lift NZ’s economic growth. Even if trade diversion and the ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect were shown to produce major costs, it is likely that NZ would, and indeed I believe that it should, continue to pursue FTAs in order to avoid its exporters becoming uncompetitive due to a lack of preferential agreements. Where NZ is able to secure a trade deal ahead of its major trade partners, as happened in the NZ-China FTA, there are tangible commercial benefits to be had. The economic, strategic, and multilateral benefits which I have identified in this analysis outweigh the liabilities, many of which remain under-researched. Although there are clear economic rationales behind NZ’s FTAs, critics should consider that NZ also gains strategically from trade deals. This is not to say that risks do not exist, but rather that with skilful management they can be minimised, while maximising the benefits.



Amnesty International (New Zealand). ‘Human rights diminished in NZ-China FTA.’ (accessed October 6, 2011). 

Andean Community. ‘About us.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

APEC. ‘Committee on Trade and Investment: Rules of Origin.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

Asian Development Bank Institute. ‘How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the Republic of China.’ ADBI Working Paper Series No. 257, December 2010. (accessed October 6, 2011).

Asian Development Bank. ‘Asia Regional Integration Center: Comparative FTA Toolkit.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

GATT Secretariat. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Geneva, July 1986.

Groser, Tim. ‘China FTA delivers economic benefits.’ Press release, February 17, 2011. (accessed October 6, 2011).

Hoadley, Stephen. Political Studies 768 lecture, University of Auckland. September 20, 2011.

Hoadley, Stephen. Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement. Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2002.

International Food Policy Research Institute. ‘The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round.’ IFPRI Issue Brief 56, December 2008. (accessed October 6, 2011).

Jagdish Bhagwati. Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Kelsey, Jane, ed. No Ordinary Deal: Unmasking the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement. Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2010.

Locke, Keith. ‘China FTA – Human Rights.’ April 22, 2008. (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘A Joint Study Report on a Free Trade Agreement Between China and New Zealand.’ Unknown date, (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘AFEAN FTA: Key Outcomes.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘ASEAN FTA Milestones: Why ASEAN?’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘China-NZ FTA: Labour and Environment.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘New Zealand and Japan.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘New Zealand-Australia Closer Economic Relations Investment Protocol.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement: National Interest Analysis.’ (accessed October 6, 2011). 

MFAT. ‘New Zealand-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. ‘Pacific: Key Pacific Issues – Trade.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. Post-Election Brief. Wellington, 2008.

MFAT. ‘Trade Relationships and Agreements.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

MFAT. A Basic Guide to Free Trade Agreements. Wellington, 2006.

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Malaysia). ‘FAQ on Malaysia-New Zealand FRA (MNZFTA).’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

OECD. ‘Trade: Key Tables from OECD, Trade in goods and services.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

Schott, Jeffrey J. Free trade agreements: US strategies and priorities. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004.

Statistics New Zealand. ‘Global New Zealand – International trade, investment, and travel profile: Year ended December 2010.’ Report available at (accessed October 6, 2011). 

WTO. ‘Regional Trade Agreements Information System.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

WTO. ‘Regionalism: friends or rivals?’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

WTO. ‘World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence.’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

Young, Audrey. ‘Pharmac still a good model for NZ: Key.’ NZ Herald, May 24, 2011. (accessed October 6, 2011).


[1] MFAT, A Basic Guide to Free Trade Agreements (Wellington, 2006), 3.

[2] Asian Development Bank, ‘Asia Regional Integration Center: Comparative FTA Toolkit,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[3] Stephen Hoadley, Political Studies 768 lecture, University of Auckland, September 20, 2011.

[4] MFAT, ‘New Zealand-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Free Trade Agreement,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[5] The Andean Community in South America, with four members, is one example of such an arrangement. See Andean Community, ‘About us,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[6] The South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA), for example, allows duty free access for Pacific Island countries to the Australian and NZ markets in nearly all goods, without requiring the same treatment for Australian and NZ goods being exported to the Pacific. See MFAT, ‘Pacific: Key Pacific Issues – Trade,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[7] GATT Secretariat, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, ‘Part I: Article I,’ Geneva, July 1986, 2.

[8] Ibid., ‘Part III: Article XXIV,’ Geneva, July 1986, 41-42.

[9] Stephen Hoadley, Negotiating Free Trade: The New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2002), 8; and World Trade Organization, ‘Regional Trade Agreements Information System,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[10] World Trade Organisation, ‘World Trade Report 2011: The WTO and preferential trade agreements: From co-existence to coherence,’ 58, (accessed October 6, 2011).

[11] Ibid., 64.

[12] The EU is a member of the largest number of FTAs, being party to 30 agreements, followed by Chile, Mexico, EFTA members, Singapore, Egypt, and Turkey. See WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011,’ 57-8.

[13] East Asian countries have become major users of FTAs since 2000; for instance, Singapore and India have concluded 10 out of 12, and 17 out of 19 of their agreements, respectively, since 2000. See WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011,’ 57.

[14] MFAT, ‘Trade Relationships and Agreements,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[15] MFAT, ‘New Zealand-Australia Closer Economic Relations Investment Protocol,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[16] WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011,’ 61.

[17]Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Malaysia), ‘FAQ on Malaysia-New Zealand FRA (MNZFTA),’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[18] OECD, ‘Trade: Key Tables from OECD, Trade in goods and services,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[19] MFAT, ‘Post-Election Brief, November 2008,’ 25.

[20] Tim Groser, as quoted in Stephen Hoadley, Negotiating Free Trade, 22.

[21] MFAT, ‘Trade Relationships and Agreements,’ (accessed October 6, 2011); and MFAT, ‘New Zealand and Japan,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[22] See, for example; MFAT, ‘ASEAN FTA Milestones: Why ASEAN?’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[23] MFAT, ‘New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement: National Interest Analysis,’ 18-19, (accessed October 6, 2011).  

[24] Tim Groser, ‘China FTA delivers economic benefits,’ press release, February 17, 2011, (accessed October 6, 2011).

[25] MFAT, ‘A Joint Study Report on a Free Trade Agreement Between China and New Zealand,’ unknown date,, 15 (accessed October 6, 2011); see also Statistics New Zealand, ‘Global New Zealand – International trade, investment, and travel profile: Year ended December 2010,’ report available at, 5.

[26] International Food Policy Research Institute, ‘The Potential Cost of a Failed Doha Round,’ IFPRI Issue Brief 56, December 2008, (accessed October 6, 2011).

[27] Tim Groser, as quoted in Stephen Hoadley, Negotiating Free Trade, 22.

[28] Stephen Hoadley, Negotiating Free Trade, 4-6.

[29] See MFAT, ‘AFEAN FTA: Key Outcomes,’ (accessed October 6, 2011); and MFAT, ‘China-NZ FTA: Labour and Environment,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[30] WTO, ‘Regionalism: friends or rivals?’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[31] Jeffrey J. Schott, Free trade agreements: US strategies and priorities (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 2004), 12.

[32] WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011,’ 60.

[33] Stephen Hoadley, Political Studies 768 lecture, University of Auckland, September 20, 2011.

[34] WTO, ‘World Trade Report 2011,’ 47-48.

[35] Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 61-70.

[36] Ibid., 63.

[37] Asian Development Bank Institute, ‘How the iPhone Widens the United States Trade Deficit with the Republic of China,’ ADBI Working Paper Series No. 257, December 2010, (accessed October 6, 2011).

[38] APEC, ‘Committee on Trade and Investment: Rules of Origin,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).

[39] See David Adamson, ‘Quarantine and Food Safety Issues in a TPPA,’ in No Ordinary Deal: Unmasking the Trans-Pacific Partnership Free Trade Agreement, ed. Jane Kelsey (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2010): 124-5; and Thomas Faunce and Ruth Townsend, ‘Public Health and Medicine Policies,’ in ibid., 149 and 156.

[40] Audrey Young, ‘Pharmac still a good model for NZ: Key,’ NZ Herald, May 24, 2011, (accessed October 6, 2011).

[41] Examples of some of these submissions can be found in Faunce and Townsend, ‘Public Health and Medicine Policies,’ 149-162.

[42] Keith Locke, ‘China FTA – Human Rights,’ April 22, 2008, (accessed October 6, 2011); and Amnesty International (New Zealand), ‘Human rights diminished in NZ-China FTA,’ (accessed October 6, 2011).